Milena Sterio is the Joseph C. Hostetler- Baker Hostetler Professor of Law at Cleveland State University College of Law and Managing Director at the Public International Law and Policy Group. She has worked extensively on Rohingya- related issues, and has visited the Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh multiple times.

On November 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in its merits judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar case that the latter is responsible for genocide perpetrated against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State. This is a landmark ruling in which the world court held for the first time ever that a state is responsible for genocide – despite the absence of other criminal court rulings establishing individual criminal responsibility for the crime of genocide. This post will analyze some of the most significant aspects of ICJ’s ruling which not only supports justice for the Rohingya, but which also has important implications for other ongoing ICJ litigation, such as the South Africa v. Israel case.

First, the ICJ majority held that evidence fully established three of the four underlying acts of genocide (under the Genocide Convention) against the Rohingya: killings (para. 319); causing them serious bodily or mental harm (paras. 329-330), including through widespread sexual violence; and imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (para. 371). The court held that the only reasonable inference explaining Myanmar’s actions was to destroy a substantial part of the Rohingya group, rejecting Myanmar’s claims that it was conducting a legitimate counterterrorism operation (para. 453). As mentioned above, the court’s judgment is unprecedented as it established, for the first time ever, that a state was responsible for genocide.

Second, the ICJ upheld its previously established “only reasonable inference” standard, from the Bosnia and Croatia v. Serbia cases, for the finding of intent to commit genocide through circumstantial evidence (para. 389). The world court also confirmed that under this standard, genocidal intent can coexist with other intents (para. 443). For example, a terrorist threat does not preclude a finding of genocidal intent; moreover, intent to forcibly displace can coexist with genocidal intent (para. 455).

According to the ICJ, “the only reasonable inference standard is met even if some elements of the evidentiary record allow additional intentions to be inferred, as long as the totality of the evidence can be explained only by the perpetrator’s genocidal intent” (para. 456).

The ICJ held that evidence which played a crucial role for the inference of genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference included: the killing of children under the age of 5; attacks on fleeing civilians; the scale and intensity of sexual violence; the lack of distinction between civilian and military targets; violence committed far in excess of military necessity; and the widespread killing of men and boys. According to the ICJ, there were no other reasonable inferences than that of genocidal intent, in light of such extensive evidence of indiscriminate violence. In addition, the ICJ highlighted the general context within Myanmar which contributed to the finding of genocide, such as legislative discrimination against the Rohingya; hate speech by high-ranking officials; previous ongoing military operations conducted against the Rohingya; as well as forcible displacement as context for the inference of genocidal intent (para. 399). According to the ICJ, while these general contextual elements do not individually constitute evidence of Myanmar’s genocidal intent, “taken together, they are important aspects of the broader contextual framework of the case from which inferences concerning the existence of genocidal intent might be drawn” (para. 399).

Third, the ICJ engaged in a more gender-nuanced analysis of genocide law by emphasizing gendered and reproductive harms. In particular, the Court found that restrictions on marriage, limits on childbirth, denial of birth registration, widespread sexual violence, and measures intended to reduce Rohingya birth rates were relevant to the inference of genocidal intent. Moreover, the court held that the destruction of a protected group may be pursued through attacks on its capacity to reproduce (para. 370). According to the ICJ, “the restrictions on marriages and births on Rohingya…, the denial of legal registration for Rohingya children… when viewed in the context of the Government’s messages regarding uncontrolled Rohingya population growth, establish an intent to impact the capacity of members of the Rohingya community to reproduce normally and thus an intent to prevent births within the group” (para. 370).

Fourth, the ICJ could not rely on any previous findings of international criminal tribunals, unlike in the Bosnia and Croatia v. Serbia genocide cases, where the world court leaned heavily on facts established by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Here, the ICJ had to fact-find on its own. The world court drew distinctions between the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) and the Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar; it attached more considerable evidentiary weight to IIMM’s findings because of this body’s criminal and investigative methodology. The ICJ Rohingya judgment is thus significant as it establishes precedent for how the world court will treat various UN investigative and accountability mechanisms, and for how the court will approach fact-finding in future cases.

Fifth, the ICJ also found that Myanmar failed to investigate, prosecute, and punish genocide. It ordered Myanmar to investigate individuals potentially responsible for genocide; to adopt legislative reforms to eliminate discrimination against the Rohingya, to provide assurances of non-repetition, and to engage in reparations vis-à-vis the Rohingya community (para. 646). The Court specifically retained jurisdiction over reparations and required Myanmar to report within two years on restitution and/or compensation measures to be provided.

Sixth, it is important to emphasize that ICJ judges in this case were not unanimous – their vote was 9 to 6 regarding the commission of genocide. In addition, the final judgment featured 11 separate opinions. This signals disagreement on the bench, as evidenced in particular by the joint dissenting opinion of Vice-President Sebutinde, Judges Tomak, Abraham, Xue, Nolte, and Judge ad hoc Kress. According to Marko Milanovic, “the majority has preserved fidelity to its prior judgments in the Bosnian and Croatian genocide cases against Serbia, but that fidelity is at times skin-deep.” Milanovic further explained that the joint dissent seemingly accused the majority of reading the notion of destruction in Article II of the Genocide Convention more flexibly and of adopting a more flexible approach to evidence. In other words, the joint dissent seems to accuse the majority of adhering to the Court’s prior jurisprudence (notably the finding that in order to infer genocidal intent from circumstantial evidence, this has to be the only reasonable inference available), while blurring the difference between genocide and ethnic cleansing/crimes against humanity (of forcible displacement and persecution) when assessing the various factors which lead the majority to its legal conclusion. The dissent – unlike the majority – concludes that all the evidence assembled together does not support the only reasonable inference of genocidal intent.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the Rohingya ICJ judgment has serious implications for other cases, and in particular the South Africa v. Israel one. According to Professor William Schabas, a leading expert on international criminal law, the ICJ Rohingya judgment is “full of messages for Israel,” and “if you exchanged the word Myanmar with Israel, you wouldn’t have to change much in the judgment.” However, the disagreement on the bench, as described above, will undoubtedly play a role in how the court addresses future allegations of genocide, as will the changing composition of the bench. It is possible to argue that the court has, while affirming its previous case law on genocide (the only reasonable inference standard in particular) signaled a willingness to adopt a more flexible approach to analyzing evidence and to weighing different evidentiary factors. Such flexibility will likely play a role in how the court approaches future cases.

In sum, the ICJ Rohingya judgment is unprecedented. It provides a measure of justice to the Rohingya community by holding, for the first time ever, that a state is responsible for genocide, and it opens the door to future cases on genocide, by signaling that judges may be willing to engage in a more flexible evidentiary analysis regarding the inference of genocidal intent. This landmark ruling will undoubtedly occupy a prominent place in genocide jurisprudence in the near future.

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